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I. INTRODUCTION
A spyware epidemic is compromising computer security in Amer-
ica.' Although the technology sector has not yet agreed on a formal
definition,2 spyware is commonly described as a type of software that
can track the online activities and collect the personal information of
Internet users.3 Spyware is often installed without a user's knowledge4
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1. See WEBROOT SOFTWARE, INC., STATE OF SPYWARE 30-32 (2005-2006),
http://www.antyspyware.pl/state-of-spyware/2005-q4-sos.pdf (reporting that more than 400,000
websites hosted spyware in 2005 and 30.5% of the world's spyware originated in the United States).
Spyware is "[s]oftware that self-installs on computers and tracks the user's Internet use, mainly for
marketing purposes." THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1643 (2d ed. 2005).
2. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, MONITORING SOFTWARE ON YOUR PC: SPYWARE, ADWARE, AND
OTHER SOFTWARE 1-5 (2005), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2005/03/050307spywarerpt.pdf (noting that a
spyware definition is elusive because of the technical complexity and dynamic nature of software).
3. See, e.g., id. at 4 (describing spyware as "software that aids in gathering information about a
person or organization without their knowledge and that may send such information to another entity
without the consumer's consent, or that asserts control over a computer without the consumer's
knowledge"); National Conference of State Legislatures, 2005 State Legislation Relating to Intemet
Spyware or Adware, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/spyware05.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2008)
[hereinafter 2005 State Legislation].
4. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 2, at 3.
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and can maliciously change settings on the user's computer 5 or cause
advertising messages, commonly known as pop-ups, to appear on the
user's
6computer screen. Difficult to detect and sometimes nearly impossible to
remove, spyware has emerged as a significant security problem for Inter-
net users.7
Spyware affects businesses as well as individuals.8 Spyware can
expose a company's confidential information, slow down computers and
networks, and destroy data.9 Employees lose efficiency while waiting
for IT staff to fix the various problems caused by spyware, which in-
creases costs. 10 Accordingly, spyware is not just a minor annoyance suf-
fered by individual Internet users; rather, it harms American businesses
and the economy as well."'
Washington and several other states have recently passed antispy-
ware legislation.1 2  This Comment will focus on the effectiveness of
Washington's Computer Spyware Act (the Act),1 3 while also surveying
similar legislation from other states and approaches proposed at the fed-
eral level. Part II discusses the Act's content and briefly explains its
definition of prohibited spyware and activities. Part III examines two
early cases to invoke the Act and describes their procedural history, from
filing to settlement. Part IV analyzes the Utah and California spyware
statutes, which blazed the trail in this emerging area of law. 14 Moreover,
at the time the first Washington lawsuits were filed, these statutes pro-
vided virtually the only state statutory guidance for Washington courts
evaluating the Act.1 5 Part V evaluates the current status of proposed fed-
eral spyware legislation and the role of the Federal Trade Commission
5. Id. at 9 (discussing browser hijacking).
6. Id. at 3-4; Chana R. Schoenberger, Spy vs. Spy, FORBES.COM, Jan. 17, 2005,
http://www.forbes.com/personaltech/2005/01/17/cz cs 0117spyvsspy.html.
7. FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 2, at 7-8.
8. See Arik Hesseldahl, Fried by Spyware, FORBES.COM, Jan. 17, 2005,
http://www.forbes.com/enterprisetech/2005/01/17/cx ah 0117spyfry.html.
9. See Microsoft.com, Microsoft's Spyware Strategy (Feb. 13, 2006),
http://www.microsoft.com/athome/security/spyware/software/msft/strategy.mspx.
10. Silicon.com, Make No Mistake - Spyware Impacts Your Business (May 2005),
http://whitepapers.silicon.com/0,39024759,60136305p,00.htm.
11. See Hesseldahl, supra note 8.
12. Benjamin Edelman, State Spyware Legislation,
http://www.benedelman.org/spyware/legislation/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2008).
13. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.270.010-900 (2008).
14. Andrew T. Braff, Defining Spyware: Necessary or Dangerous, 2 SHIDLER J.L. COM. &
TECH. 1, 1 n.6 (2005), available at http://www.lctjoumal.washington.edu/Vol2/a001Braff.html.
Utah's Spyware Control Act is codified at UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-40-101 to -401 (2007), and Cali-
fornia's Consumer Protection Against Computer Spyware Act is codified at CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE §§ 22947-22947.6 (West 2007).
15. Braff, supra note 14.
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(FTC) in adjudicating spyware disputes. Although no federal statutes on
this subject have yet been enacted, the bills currently under consideration
demonstrate the two leading approaches for penalizing spyware usage.
Finally, Part VI proposes three changes to the Act that will more effec-
tively deter prohibited conduct and compensate its victims. First, the
Act's notice requirement must be more specific. Second, the plaintiffs
burden of proving the defendant's intentional deceit should be eased; the
Act should place the burden on the defendant by creating a rebuttable
presumption of intentional deceit on the defendant's part. Finally, the
legislature must increase the damages cap. These amendments will en-
sure that Washington remains a national leader in protecting its citizens
from invasive spyware.
II. THE WASHINGTON COMPUTER SPYWARE ACT
The Act, which took effect in July 2005, makes it "unlawful for a
person who is not an owner or operator to transmit computer software to
the owner or operator's computer with actual knowledge or with con-
scious avoidance of actual knowledge," when that software is used in
certain ways. 16 Such prohibited uses include: modifying security set-
tings; collecting Internet browser histories or personally identifiable in-
formation; tracking keystrokes; preventing the blocking of software in-
stallation; and inducing the purchase of software by falsely identifying
spyware or viruses on a user's computer.1 7 The Act does not prohibit
software that monitors a computer user's Internet connection if the moni-
toring is executed by a telecommunications carrier, software provider, or
computer service providing authorized software updates,18 because these
activities aid in proper Internet functioning. 19
Only the Attorney General of Washington or an adversely affected
software provider, website owner, or trademark owner may bring suit for
a violation of the Act. 20 A plaintiff who alleges that a defendant modi-
fied certain computer settings must prove that the defendant acted with
an intent to deceive. 2 1 To prove that a defendant transmitted software to
tamper with computer functions, a plaintiff must show that the defendant
16. § 19.270.020.
17. Id.
18. § 19.270.050.
19. Free On-line Dictionary of Computing, http://foldoc.org/index.cgi?query-spyware (last
visited Mar. 17, 2008).
20. § 19.270.060.
21. § 19.270.020; H.B. 1012, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2005); Legal Opinion Letter from
Rob McKenna, Att'y Gen., State of Wash., Washington Spyware Law Addresses Serious Online
Commercial Threat (Aug. 18, 2006), http://www.wlf.org/upload/081806mckennalol.pdf.
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had actual knowledge or conscious avoidance of actual knowledge of his
* 22or her software transmission.
Damages awarded under the Act are limited to either $100,000 per
violation or actual damages, whichever is greater.23 Total damages may
not exceed $2 million.24 Repeat offenders, however, may incur a three-
fold increase in damages at the court's discretion, subject to the cap of $2
million.25
III. EARLY WASHINGTON CASES
Early in 2006, the Attorney General filed the first suit under the Act
in State v. Secure Computer, L.L. C., alleging that the defendants had per-
formed false spyware scans in order to induce users to buy their prod-
ucts. 26 Then, in August 2006, the Attorney General brought a second suit
against four Los Angeles companies in State v. Digital Enterprises, Inc.,
alleging that the companies had distributed harmful spyware to users un-
der the guise of promoting the companies' subscription-based entertain-
27ment services. Because settlements with individual defendants have
been reached in these two cases, neither case was decided in court.28
Nevertheless, their procedural histories may provide guidance for other
courts attempting to apply antispyware legislation, which currently have
a limited body of case law to consult.29
22. § 19.270.030.
23. § 19.270.060(1).
24. § 19.270.060(3).
25. § 19.270.060(2).
26. Complaint for Injunctive and Additional Relief under the CAN-SPAM Act, the Unsolicited
Commercial Email Act, the Computer Spyware Act, and the Unfair Bus. Practices-Consumer Prot.
Act 8.10-13, State v. Secure Computer, L.L.C., No. C06-0126RSL (W.D. Wash. Jan. 24, 2006),
2006 WL 317035 [hereinafter Complaint, State v. Secure Computer, L.L.C.]; see also Complaint for
Damages and Injunctive Relief 70-74, Microsoft Corp. v. Secure Computer, L.L.C., No. CV06-
0128 JCC (W.D. Wash. Jan. 25, 2006), 2006 WL 236341.
27. Complaint for Injunctive and Additional Relief under the Unfair Bus. Practices-Consumer
Prot. Act and the Computer Spyware Act 6.1-6.8, 7.1-7.3, State v. Digital Enterprises, Inc., No.
CV06-4923 CAS (W.D. Wash. Aug. 4, 2006) [hereinafter Complaint, State v. Digital Enterprises,
Inc.] (on file with author).
28. McKenna, supra note 21.
29. Although several lawsuits based upon state spyware statutes have been filed, many have
settled out of court. See generally Sony BMG Settles CD Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2006, at C4,
available at 2006 WLNR 8813358; Sony BMG Tentatively Settles Suits on Spyware, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 30, 2005, at C4, available at 2005 WLNR 22097854; Lisa Lerer, Anti-Spyware Settlement,
FORBES.COM, Dec. 4, 2006, http://www.forbes.com/security/2006/12/04/spyware-settlement-
washington-tech-security-cx 11 1204spyware.html.
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A. State v. Secure Computer, L.L.C.
State v. Secure Computer, L.L.C. was the first lawsuit filed under
the Act.30 The Attorney General filed the complaint against Secure
Computer, a New York limited liability company, its president, and four
individuals who allegedly advertised or otherwise aided the distribution
of the company's products.3' The complaint accused Secure Computer
of violating two provisions of the Act.32
First, the complaint alleged that Secure Computer violated Revised
Code of Washington (RCW) section 19.270.040(1) by intentionally mar-
keting and selling products that purported to scan computers for spyware,
alarming users, and enticing (or even forcing) them to purchase the prod-
ucts.33 The complaint further alleged that Secure Computer persuaded
users to get a free scan with pop-up advertisements that mimicked the
Microsoft Windows security "dialog boxes. 34 These boxes advised us-
ers that their computers might be infected with spyware; when users
clicked the box, they were guided through a process that downloaded
Secure Computer spyware onto their computers. 35 Moreover, the com-
plaint alleged that these scans failed to detect spyware on infected com-
puters and purported to detect spyware on computers that had none.
36
Following the free scan, users received a false scan report that listed the
types of spyware claimed to be found on their computers.37 When users
clicked the button to remove the spyware, the dialog box prompted users
to purchase "Spyware Cleaner" for $49.95 by inputting credit card and
other information. 38
30. Complaint, State v. Secure Computer, L.L.C., supra note 26; see also Robert McMillan,
Antispyware Company Sued under Spyware Law, PC WORLD, Jan. 26, 2006,
http://www.pcworld.com/article/id, 124508-page, 1/article.html.
31. Press Release, Wash. State Office of the Att'y Gen., Attorney General McKenna An-
nounces $1 Million Settlement in Washington's First Spyware Suit (Dec. 4, 2006), available at
http://www.atg.wa.gov/pressrelease.aspx?id=5926 [hereinafter Press Release].
32. Complaint, State v. Secure Computer, L.L.C., supra note 26, 8.8, .13, .21 (alleging
violations of WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.270.030(2)(b), .040(1) (2008)); see also Press Release, supra
note 31.
33. Complaint, State v. Secure Computer, L.L.C., supra note 26, 8.2, .8; see WASH. REV.
CODE § 19.270.040(1) (2008) (providing that it is unlawful for a person who is not an owner or
operator to "[i]nduce an owner or operator to install a computer software component onto the com-
puter by intentionally misrepresenting the extent to which installing the software is necessary for
security or privacy reasons").
34. Complaint, State v. Secure Computer, L.L.C., supra note 26, 8.3. A "dialog box" is a
window utilized in user interfaces to display information to the user or to get a response. THE
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 500 (4th ed. 2000).
35. Complaint, State v. Secure Computer, L.L.C., supra note 26, 8.4.
36. Press Release, supra note 31.
37. Complaint, State v. Secure Computer, L.L.C., supra note 26, 8.5-.6.
38. Id. 8.6.
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Second, the complaint alleged that Secure Computer violated RCW
section 19.270.030(2)(b) when Secure Computer transferred software to
users' computers that altered the users' security settings. 39 Allegedly, the
free scan software that produced the false scan reports also erased safe-
guards that users placed on their computers to protect themselves from
viruses and spyware, rendering the computers more susceptible to these
dangers .4
By June 2006, three individually named defendants settled for sums
ranging from $2,000 to $84,000.41 The case ended in December 2006
when Secure Computer president Paul Burke agreed to a $1 million set-
tlement, of which only $75,000 was allocated to compensate the 1,145
Washington consumers who bought and were harmed by the software.4 2
The State allocated the remaining $925,000 for penalties, attorney's fees,
and costs. 43 Secure Computer is now out of business. 44 Although this
case did not create any precedent to guide future courts deciding disputes
under the Act, it put spyware companies on notice that violations of the
Act will result in prosecution.
B. State v. Digital Enterprises, Inc.
In August 2006, the Attorney General brought suit against four Los
Angeles companies and two individuals for allegedly promoting an
online subscription-based entertainment service in violation of the Act.45
The service provided movie clips, adult content, entertainment reviews,
and Internet shopping information.4 6 Yearly subscription fees ranged
from $85 to $99, and monthly subscription fees ranged from $19.95 to
$34.95."7
The companies allegedly utilized pop-up advertising to offer a free
three-day trial but required computer users to download software in order
to accept the offer.48 Unfortunately, while this software did provide a
free trial, it also allowed the defendants to deliver a relentless string of
39. Id. 8.20-21; see WASH. REV. CODE § 19.270.030(2)(b) (2008) (providing that "[i]t is
unlawful for a person who is not an owner or operator of a user's computer to transmit computer
software with actual knowledge or with conscious avoidance of actual knowledge and to use the
software to ... modify any of the [computer's security] settings related to the computer's access to,
or use of, the internet").
40. Complaint, State v. Secure Computer, L.L.C., supra note 26, 8.19.
41. McKenna, supra note 21.
42. Lerer, supra note 29.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Complaint, State v. Digital Enterprises, Inc., supra note 27.
46. Id. 5.1.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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pop-up windows demanding payment.49  These demands covered the
computer screen and would not close.5° Instead, the computer user's
only option was to click "Continue," which launched a 40-second video
that, again, the user was unable to close.51 Finally, the user was con-
fronted with a screen that provided only two options: pay the fee or be
reminded again approximately one hour later to pay the fee, which would
restart the entire process. 52 Eventually, many users tired of the reminders
and paid either the monthly or yearly fee.53 As such, the State alleged,
the free three-day trial was nothing but a "smokescreen. 54
In April 2007, the Attorney General announced a settlement in the
case.55 The defendants agreed to pay $50,000 and to cease offering
anonymous free trials to Washington consumers for their movie
download service. 6 In addition, they agreed to not install any billing
software on a Washington user's computer without his or her express
consent, to disclose whether the software will cause any pop-ups, and to
clearly state all important contract terms in any advertisement.57
The Act specifically prohibits using an Internet service to take con-
trol of and damage a user's computer.58  If no settlement had been
reached in this case, the court could have found the defendants liable
even though users initially consented to receive the software necessary
for the free trial.59 If, at trial, the State was able to demonstrate that the
defendants intentionally misrepresented the software's purpose, actions,
or effect, it likely would have prevailed on the issue of the defendants'
liability under the Act.60
The Digital Enterprises defendants could have also been found li-
able for misrepresenting that their computer software could be unin-
stalled or disabled by the owner's actions. 61 When users attempted to
remove the defendants' software by using the standard "Add/Remove
Programs" function, the software allegedly provided a dialog box that
either redirected the users to the payment screen or terminated the
49. Id. 5.2.
50. Id.
51. Id. TT 6.4-.6.
52. Id. TT 6.6-.7.
53. Id. 5.2.
54. Id.
55. Press Release, supra note 31.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.270.040(1) (2008).
59. See Complaint, State v. Digital Enterprises, Inc., supra note 27, 6.3.
60. See § 19.270.020(3), .030.
61. § 19.270.020(4).
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"Add/Remove Programs" function. 62 Therefore, if the case had not set-
tled, it is quite possible that the court would have agreed with the State's
argument that the software was intentionally designed to prevent Internet
users from uninstalling the software through reasonable efforts, in viola-
tion of the Act.63
IV. COMPARISON TO SPYWARE LEGISLATION IN OTHER STATES
In addition to Washington, sixteen states passed antispyware legis-
lation between 2004 and 2006, and a majority of states have considered
similar legislation.64 Utah broke ground in 2004 by passing the Spyware
Control Act (SCA), 65 which was the first state statute to regulate spy-
ware. California followed suit and passed the Consumer Protection
Against Computer Spyware Act (CPACSA) later that year.66
Utah and California were the only states to pass antispyware legis-
lation before Washington;67 those statutes, therefore, provided virtually
the only available guidance for the Secure Computers and Digital Enter-
prises courts. This Part begins by describing the SCA and discussing an
important spyware case filed under it, WhenU.com, Inc. v. State.68 Next,
the Part describes the CPACSA and the class action suit against Sony
BMG Music Entertainment that invoked it. 6
9
A. Utah: The First State to Pass Antispyware Legislation
In 2004, Utah passed the first state antispyware legislation, which
was broadly amended in 2005.70 Like the Act, the SCA requires that pro-
viders of downloadable software give Internet users notice and obtain
62. Complaint, State v. Digital Enterprises, Inc., supra note 27, 7.2.
63. See § 19.270.020(4).
64. National Conference of State Legislatures, 2006 State Legislation Relating to Internet
Spyware or Adware, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/spyware06.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2008);
see also National Conference of State Legislatures, 2004 State Legislation Relating to Internet Spy-
ware or Adware, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/spyware04.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2008); 2005
State Legislation, supra note 3.
65. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-40-101 to -401 (2007).
66. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 22947-22947.6 (West 2007).
67. See Braff, supra note 14.
68. Complaint, WhenU.com, Inc. v. State, No. 040907578 (Utah Dist. Ct. Apr. 12, 2004),
available at http://www.benedelman.org/spyware/whenu-utah/complaint.pdf.
69. Class Action Complaint for Jury Trial Demand, Guevara v. Sony BMG Music Entertain-
ment, No. BC342359 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 2005), 2005 WL 3143266 [hereinafter Class Action
Complaint].
70. §§ 13-40-101 to -401; Anita Ramasastry, Can Utah's New Anti-Spyware Law Work?,
FINDLAW, June 1, 2004, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ramasastry/20040601 .html.
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their consent before installation occurs. 71 Damages under the SCA are
limited to $500 per violation or actual damages, whichever is greater.7
Before the SCA was enacted, the bill's sponsors received criticism
from industry giants such as Google, Microsoft, Yahoo!, eBay, and
others for drafting an overly broad definition of spyware.73 The critics
asserted that the spyware definition included some beneficial and neces-
sary software applications that provide basic Internet functions.74  They
warned that impeding access to these applications would actually de-
crease computer security by interfering with the data collection utilized
by Internet companies to prevent hacker attacks. 75 These concerns ulti-
mately failed to persuade the Utah legislature to vote down the bill,
which was approved with the disputed spyware definition in March
2004.76
Immediately before the SCA was to become effective, however,
adware77 manufacturer WhenU.com, Inc. filed suit in the Third Judicial
District Court in Salt Lake County, challenging the statute's constitution-
ality.78 WhenU.com contended that sales of its adware products would
be adversely affected by the SCA 79 because it proscribed the installation
of software that tracked users' online actions, sent personal data to other
companies, or generated pop-up advertisements.8"
WhenU.com also alleged that the state of Utah had interfered with
its rights under the Commerce Clause and the First and Fourteenth
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.8 1 In support of its Commerce
Clause claim, WhenU.com challenged the State's ability to regulate
commerce outside of Utah's borders and impose excessive burdens on
71. § 13-40-201.
72. § 13-40-301(2)(b).
73. Letter from AOL et al. to John Valentine, Majority Leader, Utah State Senate, and Steve
Urquhart, Representative, Utah State House of Representatives (Mar. 1, 2004), available at
http://www.benedelman.org/spyware/utah-mar04/letter-0 Imar04.pdf.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. § 13-40-102.
77. Adware is generally defined as any software application that displays advertising banners
while the program is running. SearchCIO-Midmarket.com Definitions, http://searchcio-
midmarket.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid183_gci521293,00.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2008).
Adware is not necessarily banned under antispyware statutes. For an example of sanctionable ad-
ware conduct, however, consider the case of adware manufacturer Zango, Inc., based in Bellevue,
Washington, which settled with the FTC in November 2006. See Lisa Lerer, Adware Firm Settles
With Feds, FORBES.COM, Nov. 3, 2006, http://www.forbes.com/security/2006/I1/03/adware-ftc-
zango-tech-security-cxl II 103zango.html.
78. Complaint, supra note 68.
79. See id. 19.
80. § 13-40-201.
81. Complaint, supra note 68, 3.
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interstate commerce in relation to the small local benefit.82 WhenU.com
also argued both that the statute violated its First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights to commercial free speech and expressive activity and
that the State could not show a tailored, compelling state interest to jus-
tify that infringement.83
WhenU.com won a partial victory when the court temporarily en-
joined the law from going into effect.84 Yet before the parties could liti-
gate the constitutionality of the statute, the legislature amended the stat-
ute, narrowing the definition of spyware as well as the types of prohib-
ited conduct.85 Although WhenU.com subsequently abandoned its con-
stitutional challenge, this case nevertheless drew nationwide attention to
the emerging spyware problem and Utah's pioneering SCA.86
B. California Follows Utah's Lead
In September 2004, the California legislature passed the CPACSA87
and became the second state to legislatively address the spyware prob-
lem. Like the Act and the SCA, the CPACSA outlaws the installation of
software on someone else's computer without notice.88 It also both pro-
hibits the collection of personally identifiable information through inten-
tionally deceptive means and bans software that cannot be uninstalled or
disabled.8 9
Critics of the CPACSA argue that its notice provision is too leni-
ent.90 Like the Act, the CPACSA's notice provision only requires in-
forming the computer user that software will be installed on their com-
puter if the user consents (typically by clicking "OK" in a dialog box). 91
Critics argue that this general notice requirement is ineffective because
many users manifest consent without comprehending the software's po-
tential impact on their computers.92
In addition, critics contend that the CPACSA should not place on
plaintiffs the onerous burden of proving that the defendants' actions were
82. Id. 66-67.
83. Id. 72-73.
84. Transcript of Record at 7, WhenUcom, Inc. v. State, No. 040907578 (Utah Dist. Ct. June
22, 2004), available at http://www.benedelman.org/spyware/whenu-utah/pi-ruling-transcript.pdf.
85. § 13-40-102.
86. Ramasastry, supra note 70.
87. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 22947-22947.6 (West 2007).
88. § 22947.2.
89. § 22947.2(b).
90. Jordan M. Blanke, "Robust Notice" and "Informed Consent:" The Keys to Successful
Spyware Legislation, 7 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REv. 2 (2006).
91. § 22947.1(h)(3).
92. Benjamin Edelman, California's Toothless Spyware Law (Sept. 29, 2004),
http://www.benedelman.org/news/092904- I.html.
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"intentionally deceptive." 93 This intentional deception element must also
be proven by plaintiffs under the Act.94
One of the first lawsuits filed under this statute was a large class ac-
tion against Sony BMG Music Entertainment. 95 In an attempt to prevent
illegal copying, Sony BMG had embedded Extended Copy Protection
technology (XCP2) in its copyrighted music CDs, which limited the ca-
pability of personal computers to copy the CDs.96
The complaint alleged that XCP2 contained a "rootkit" program, so
named because the program attaches to the "root" of a computer and dis-
guises itself to avoid detection.97 Similar to spyware, the program alleg-
edly made itself difficult to find, monitored computer usage, prevented
removal without damage to the computer's operating system, and pos-
sessed misleading file names. 98 In addition, XCP2 increased a com-
puter's vulnerability to worms and other viruses. 99
Similar suits were soon filed against Sony BMG in New York and
Texas.1i ° Sony BMG eventually entered into settlements in which it
agreed to stop manufacturing CDs containing XCP2.1l Sony BMG also
agreed to compensate consumers with free music downloads, small cash
payments, and replacement CDs in exchange for the infected CDs. 10 2
Although this case did not result in a judicial opinion, it is nonetheless
significant because the suit was brought by several class action plain-
tiffs. 10 3 This is unusual; spyware lawsuits have generally been initiated
by state attorneys general or the FTC. 10 4  Sony BMG, however, appar-
93. H.B. 1012, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2005); Letter from Pam Dixon, Executive Dir.,
World Privacy Forum, and Beth Givens, Dir., Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, to Arnold Schwar-
zenegger, Governor, State of Cal. (Sept. 12, 2004), available at
http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/SB 1436Letter.htm.
94. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.270.020 (2008).
95. Class Action Complaint, supra note 69.
96. Dan Mitchell, What's Online; The Rootkit of All Evil, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2005, at C5,
available at 2005 WLNR 18689390.
97. Class Action Complaint, supra note 69, 2.
98. Id.
99. Tom Zeller Jr., The Ghost in the CD; Sony BMG Stirs a Debate over Software Used to
Guard Content, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2005, at Ci, available at 2005 WLNR 18365842.
100. Civil Complaint, Michaelson v. Sony BMG Music, Inc., No. 05 CV 9575 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
14, 2005), available at http://www.sonysuit.com/classactions/michaelson/complaint.pdf; Plaintiffs
Original Petition, State v. Sony BMG Music Entm't, L.L.C., (Tex. Dist. Ct. Nov. 21, 2005), avail-
able at http://www.sonysuit.com/classactions/texas/complaint.pdf
101. Sony BMG Settles CD Case, supra note 29; Sony BMG Tentatively Settles Suits On Spy-
ware, supra note 29.
102. Sony BMG Tentatively Settles Suits on Spyware, supra note 29.
103. Sony BMG Settles CD Case, supra note 29.
104. See, e.g., Complaint, State v. Digital Enterprises, Inc., supra note 27; Complaint, State v.
Secure Computer, L.L.C., supra note 26; Federal Trade Commission, Spyware Enforcement Ac-
tions, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/spyware/law-enfor.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2008).
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ently did not learn a lesson from the rootkit debacle. In August 2007,
two security companies found that USB drives sold by Sony BMG in-
stalled hidden software on users' computers.10 5
V. NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND ENFORCEMENT
Although many states have enacted spyware statutes, spyware is
also subject to federal regulations promulgated by the FTC and, poten-
tially, congressional legislation. The FTC currently regulates spyware
through its administrative adjudication of disputes.10 6 In addition, Con-
gress is currently considering four different spyware bills.' °7 The Se-
curely Protect Yourself Against Cyber Trespass Act (Spy Act) and the
Internet Spyware Prevention Act of 2005 (I-SPY) represent two ap-
proaches lawmakers have taken to address the national spyware problem.
The first approach discussed in this Part focuses on problems created by
specific technology and is utilized in the Spy Act. 108 I-SPY exemplifies
the second approach, which focuses instead on problems created by be-
haviors. 109 Finally, this Part discusses the basis for FTC spyware regula-
tion and describes a milestone case successfully prosecuted by the FTC.
A. The Spy Act
The Spy Act would allow the FTC to seek civil penalties"0 against
anyone that transmits spyware programs to a computer without notice
and the user's consent.' 11 The Spy Act was passed by the House of Rep-
resentatives in May 2005 and has been referred to the Senate Committee
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, where it remains under con-
sideration.' 12
The Spy Act is fairly specific in regulating certain technologies and
their problems, as well as exempting other technologies.' 13 For example,
it prohibits software that logs keystrokes, fraudulently induces purchase
105. Andy Greenberg, Sony's Spyware Strikes Back, FORBES.COM, Aug. 29, 2007, available at
http://www.forbes.com/technology/2007/08/29/sony-rootkit-security-tech-cx ag-829spyware.html.
106. Federal Trade Commission, A Guide to the Federal Trade Commission (Mar. 2004),
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/general/gen03.shtm.
107. See SPY BLOCK Act, S. 687, 109th Cong. (2006); Internet Spyware (I-SPY) Prevention
Act of 2005, H.R. 744, 109th Cong. (2005); Spy Act, H.R. 29, 109th Cong. (2005); Enhanced Con-
sumer Protection Against Spyware Act of 2005, S. 1004, 109th Cong. (2005).
108. See H.R. 29.
109. See H.R. 744.
110. H.R. 29 § 4(a).
111. H.R. 29 § 3(c).
112. The Library of Congress, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:h.r.00029: (last
visited Mar. 17, 2008).
113. See H.R. 29.
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of products, or displays advertisements that cannot be easily closed.' l4 If
the Senate passes the bill in its present form, it would exempt
technologies that merely facilitate the appearance of Web pages without
monitoring consumers' behavior or gathering personal information, such
as "cookies."'"15  Companies that monitor their own Web sites and
advertise their products based upon that data would also be exempted by
the Spy Act.16
B. I-SPY
The second piece of national legislation under consideration is I-
SPY, which simply outlaws the installation of software that leaks
personal information or threatens computer security without a user's
consent. 117 In sharp contrast to the twelve lengthy sections of text that
make up the Spy Act, I-SPY comprises four pithy sections and has an
entirely different focus. 18  While the Spy Act regulates specific tech-
nologies, I-SPY regulates culpable behavior. 119 Because it focuses on
behavior, the technology sector has applauded I-SPY for being less bur-
densome on Internet innovation.12 0  By failing to identify any specific
technologies, however, I-SPY may be too vague to enforce. 121 Notably,
the approach taken by the Act is more similar to I-SPY than it is to the
Spy Act, as the Act largely regulates culpable behaviors and actions
rather than specific technologies. 122
C. Criticism Directed at National Proposals
Opponents of the Spy Act and other spyware bills compare them to
the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing
Act of 2003 (CAN-SPAM), 123 which has been largely ineffective in
eliminating junk email. 124  Indeed, CAN-SPAM convictions have been
114. H.R. 29 §§ I(e), 2(a)(3).
115. Id.
116. H.R. 29 § 3(b)(2)(A)-(C).
117. Internet Spyware (1-SPY) Prevention Act of 2005, H.R. 744, 109th Cong. § 2(b) (2005).
118. See H.R. 744; H.R. 29.
119. H.R. 744 § 2; H.R. 29.
120. Letter from Ari Schwartz, Assoc. Dir., Ctr. for Democracy & Tech., to James
Sensenbrenner, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, and John Conyers, Ranking
Member, Comm. on the Judiciary (Sept. 24, 2004), available at
http://www.cdt.org/privacy/spyware/20040924cdtjudiciary.pdf.
121. See H.R. 744. Identifying specific technologies allows a court to more easily determine
whether an illegal act has taken place. In contrast, behaviors and characteristics of various types of
software are sometimes difficult to determine and understand.
122. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.270.020 (2008); see H.R. 744 § 2.
123. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7713 (2006).
124. Vivek Arora, The CAN-SPAMAct: An Inadequate Attempt to Deal with a Growing Prob-
lem, 39 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 299, 325 (2006).
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few and far between.125 Even more troubling for the spyware bills is the
fact that CAN-SPAM already prohibits the transfer of software to
another user's computer without that user's consent.1 26 The failures of
CAN-SPAM raise significant doubt as to whether the federal government
is even capable of regulating these facets of the Internet.127 Software and
other computer technologies are constantly changing, and Congress is
not renowned for its nimbleness; any attempt on its part to combat spy-
ware faces the likelihood of being rendered obsolete soon after passage.
One possible answer to this concern can be found in I-SPY, which does
not name specific technologies, but focuses instead on culpable behav-
iors, such as accessing a computer without authorization, regardless of
the means by which the resulting intrusion is accomplished. 128
Another criticism of the spyware bills centers on the federal gov-
ernment's interference with state legislation. State legislatures are effec-
tively responding to spyware dangers by passing laws, 129 but those laws
will likely be preempted by any national legislation. The state legislative
process may be in a better position to quickly adapt to rapid changes in
technology.1 30  If state spyware laws are working, the argument goes,
national legislation would unnecessarily hinder state successes.
In addition, federal legislation might unintentionally affect legiti-
mate businesses. 31 For example, the Spy Act is a massive document
with numerous regulations and exceptions that are aimed at specific, cur-
rent technology.1 32 For the same reasons that Utah met significant resis-
tance from technology sector giants, federal legislation (especially the
Spy Act) is subject to criticism for providing overinclusive lists of pro-
hibited technologies that inhibit basic Internet browser functionality. 133
Again, a possible answer to this criticism is I-SPY, which prohibits cer-
tain behaviors instead of banning specific technologies. 134
125. Sharon Gaudin, Two Men Convicted of Spamming Pornography, INFORMATIONWEEK,
June 26, 2007, http://www.informationweek.com/news/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=200000756;
Edvard Pettersson, California Man Guilty of Defrauding AOL Subscribers, U.S. Says, BLOOMBERG,
Jan. 16, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a3ukhOXubw3Y.
126. § 7701.
127. Arik Hesseldahl, Spyware Wars, FORBES.COM, May 13, 2005,
http://www.forbes.com/personaltech/2005/05/13/cx ah 0513diglife.html.
128. See Internet Spyware (I-SPY) Prevention Act of 2005, H.R. 744, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005).
129. See supra note 64.
130. The States and Cyber Security, NEWSL. (Cyber Sec. Indus. Alliance, Washington, D.C.),
Nov. 2004, available at http://www.csialliance.org/news/newsletters/newsletternov-
04.html#2.%20volume%201%2ONo.%203.
131. David McGuire, States Speed Up Spyware Race, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, May 13, 2004,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A24746-2004Mayl 3.html.
132. Spy Act, H.R. 29, 109th Cong. (2005).
133. AOL et al., supra note 73.
134. See Internet Spyware (I-SPY) Prevention Act of 2005, H.R. 744, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005).
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D. The Role of the Federal Trade Commission
In addition to possible federal legislation, the FTC has authority to
regulate spyware on a national level.135  The FTC was created by
President Wilson in 1914 for the purpose of preventing unfair competi-
tion practices in commerce. 36  Five commissioners-nominated by the
President and approved by Congress-head the FTC for terms of seven
years.137
Since the FTC's creation, Congress has passed several consumer
protection laws empowering it to protect American consumers against
unfair or deceptive practices. 138 For the good of the general public inter-
est, the FTC can enforce regulations by conducting investigations and
initiating actions against defendants engaging in such practices., 39  The
FTC has already successfully pursued claims against several spyware
companies and, like the state of Washington, has pursued an action
against Digital Enterprises, Inc. 140  In order to facilitate reporting of
fraudulent spyware practices, the FTC provides consumers with a toll-
free number and online complaint forms.1 41 With the assistance of these
reports, the FTC filed eight actions against spyware perpetrators in 2005
and 2006.142
One such case that resulted in a landmark judgment was FTC v.
SmartBot.Net, Inc.143 This case bears many similarities to Secure Com-
puter, and it will likely be considered by courts hearing spyware disputes
nationwide since it is one of the only spyware cases to result in the entry
of a judgment. 44 The FTC's complaint alleged that the defendants used
a variety of methods to direct Internet users to their network of web
sites.145 When users arrived at the defendants' Web pages, spyware was
135. Federal Trade Commission, supra note 106.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, FTC v. Digital Enter-
prises, Inc., No. CV06-4923CAS AJWx (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2006), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0623008/060808movielandcmplt.pdf.
141. FTC Consumer Complaint Form,
https://m.ftc.gov/pls/dod/wsolcq$.startup?Z ORGCODE=PU01 (last visited Mar. 18, 2008); News
Release, Federal Trade Commission, Court Halts Spyware Operations (May 4, 2006), available at
http://ftc.gov/opa/2006/05/seismic.htm.
142. Federal Trade Commission, supra note 104.
143. FTC v. SmartBot.Net, Inc., No. 04-CV-377-JD (D.N.H. Mar. 16, 2006), 2006 WL
2058491.
144. The court ordered complete disgorgement of $4 million in profits gained through unfair
business practices. Id. at *3.
145. Complaint for Injunction and Other Equitable Relief 12, FTC v. SmartBot.Net, Inc., No.
04-CV-377-JD, (D.N.H. Oct. 6, 2004), 2004 WL 3958666.
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installed on their computers without notice or authorization, causing pop-
up advertising (including full-page ads) and other software to appear and
eventually leading to computer malfunction. 146  The spyware also
allegedly changed the users' home page to one of the defendants' Web
pages; it also changed the users' search engines to one of the defendants'
search engines. 147 This allegedly allowed the defendants to control the
Web pages and search results to which users navigated, and they took
advantage of this ability by continuously downloading spyware onto the
users' computers. 1
48
As in Secure Computer, some of the pop-ups in this case simulated
Windows dialog boxes and urgently warned users to download antispy-
ware programs. 149 If the user heeded this warning and clicked the link,
he or she was prompted to purchase antispyware software for $30.150
The defendants allegedly received a percentage of the profits made
through sales of these software programs. 151
The FTC brought suit in federal court in New Hampshire; that court
eventually granted a default judgment against defendants and ordered
them to disgorge their profits. 152 In addition, the court barred the defen-
dants from transmitting spyware or other software onto computers or
changing users' home pages or search engines without consent.'15 This
case gained nationwide attention because of the large disgorgement or-
der: $4 million in profits gained from engaging in unfair business activi-
ties. 154 This case is also significant because it resulted in a judgment,
rather than a settlement; it thus created valuable case law for courts
around the country. 155
VI. A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
Although the Act effectively addresses many aspects of Washing-
ton's spyware problem, three improvements should be made. First, the
goals of the Act would be better served if it provided better direction on
what satisfies the notice requirement. Second, the requirement that
plaintiffs prove defendants acted with intent to deceive is at odds with
much consumer protection legislation and is too heavy of a burden for
146. Id. 13.
147. Id. 14-15.
148. Id.
149. Id. 18.
150. Id.
151. Id. 19.
152. Federal Trade Commission, supra note 141.
153. Id
154. Id.
155. Id.
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most spyware victims to carry. 15 6 Finally, a damages cap of $2 million
neither adequately compensates victims for their economic loss nor ef-
fectively deters those who profit from the use of spyware.
A. The Notice Requirement Should Be More Specific
The Washington legislature should amend the Act to incorporate a
more comprehensive notice provision. Currently, the Act does not de-
scribe how notice should be given to the user before software is installed.
The only mention of notice is in the "Definitions" section of the statute,
where notice is used to define intentional deception in terms of a com-
pany's behavior.' 57
The goals of the Act would be better effectuated if it included a de-
scriptive notice provision. The notice provision is essentially the first
line of defense for a user because he or she decides to accept or reject the
software based upon the information given in the download dialog
box. 158 If users cannot determine the impact particular software will
have on their computer, they may unwittingly agree to download soft-
ware that acts nothing like what they had anticipated.
The SCA has gone so far as to require that software companies
write their notices in plain language and show full-sized examples of ad-
vertisements that users will see. 159 Although opponents of a broad notice
provision argue that compliance will be unduly burdensome, make their
products less attractive, and stifle Internet innovation,' 60 Utah's notice
provision is reasonable because it allows users to make informed deci-
sions about the degree of control they will maintain over their computers.
Because the Act's notice requirement does not provide specific guide-
lines for what constitutes adequate notice, users face increased danger
that they will inadvertently consent to the transmittal of potentially dan-
gerous spyware. Therefore, in order to afford greater protection to its
constituents, the Washington legislature should amend the Act to incor-
porate the SCA's descriptive notice provision.
A second reason to expand the Act's notice provision is that spy-
ware promoters will more clearly understand what is required under the
statute, and noncompliance will be more easily discernable. Currently
the Act fails to specify exactly what notice is required. In defending
156. H.B. 1012, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2005); McKenna, supra note 21.
157. See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.270.010(5)(c) (2008) (defining intentionally deceptive be-
havior as consisting of "[a]n intentional and material failure to provide any notice to an owner or
operator regarding the installation or execution of computer software in order to deceive the owner
or operator").
158. Schoenberger, supra note 6.
159. UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-40-102 (2007).
160. Complaint, supra note 68, 14.
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claims brought under the Act, then, defendants will likely assert that they
honestly or reasonably attempted to comply with this vague language and
thus did not violate the statute. In fact, WhenU.com prospectively ar-
gued this very point in its challenge to the SCA. 16 1 This argument is a
potential loophole for defendants that should be closed through the draft-
ing of express language with specific definitions and notice require-
ments. In addition, this amendment would allow courts adjudicating
these disputes to more easily determine whether defendants complied
with the notice requirement. In sum, a more comprehensive notice pro-
vision is in the best interest of Washington citizens and would better
serve the goals of the legislation.
B. Plaintiffs Should Not Be Required to Prove Intentional Deceit
Under the Act, a plaintiff is required to prove that a defendant was
intentionally deceptive in modifying a computer's settings.162  The
CPACSA similarly imposes this burden on the plaintiff, and critics argue
that this is an unreasonably difficult showing to make. 163  Admittedly,
definitions of spyware vary. 164 The Act, however, lays out detailed lists
of illegal activities that are typically carried out by most types of spy-
ware. 165 The average computer user would not knowingly engage in this
161. Id. 15.
162. § 19.270.020.
163. H.B. 1012, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2005); Dixon & Givens, supra note 93.
164. Braff, supra note 14.
165. The Act states that
[i]t is unlawful for a person who is not an owner or operator to transmit computer soft-
ware to the owner or operator's computer with actual knowledge or with conscious
avoidance of actual knowledge and to use such software to do any of the following:
(1) Modify, through intentionally deceptive means, settings that control any of the fol-
lowing: (a) The page that appears when an owner or operator launches an internet
browser or similar computer software used to access and navigate the interet; (b) The
default provider or web proxy the owner or operator uses to access or search the internet;
and (c) The owner or operator's list of bookmarks used to access web pages;
(2) Collect, through intentionally deceptive means, personally identifiable information:
(a) Through the use of a keystroke-logging function that records all keystrokes made by
an owner or operator and transfers that information from the computer to another
person; (b) In a manner that correlates such information with data respecting
all or substantially all of the web sites visited by an owner or operator, other
than web sites operated by the person collecting such information; and (c)
Described in WASH. REV. CODE 19.270.010(9) (d), (e), or (f)(i) or (ii) by
extracting the information from the owner or operator's hard drive;
(3) Prevent, through intentionally deceptive means, an owner or operator's
reasonable efforts to block the installation or execution of, or to disable, computer soft-
ware by causing the software that the owner or operator has properly
removed or disabled automatically to reinstall or reactivate on the computer;
(4) Intentionally misrepresent that computer software will be uninstalled or disabled by
an owner or operator's action; and
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prohibited conduct. Moreover, the listed activities are unreasonably
invasive to a computer user's privacy, with or without proof of inten-
tional deception.
Instead of requiring plaintiffs to meet such a high burden, the Act
should be amended to create a rebuttable presumption that defendants
acted with an intent to deceive. Making intentional deceit a rebuttable
presumption is reasonable because defendants are in a better position to
offer evidence of their own intent in distributing and managing the soft-
ware in issue. If a defendant engaged in activities prohibited by the Act
without any ulterior motive or an intent to deceive the user, the defendant
should be required to bring forth evidence showing the legitimate reasons
for his or her actions. Requiring a plaintiff to prove the defendant's in-
tentional deceit is overly burdensome and is simply unnecessary to prove
that the plaintiff was harmed by the defendant's actions.166
Notably, requiring plaintiffs to show that defendants possessed ac-
tual knowledge or conscious avoidance of actual knowledge in transmit-
ting software should remain unchanged.167 Many kinds of software, in-
cluding spyware and viruses, are inadvertently transmitted to and from
computers connected to the Internet. Prosecuting individuals who had no
actual knowledge or conscious avoidance of actual knowledge in trans-
mitting software would not serve the goals of this legislation. If such
prosecution were allowed, a victim of spyware infiltration would likely
unknowingly later become a perpetrator under the law.
C. The Damages Cap Must Be Increased
The Act currently imposes a damages cap of $2 million. 68 In com-
parison to the actual damage spyware causes Americans each year, 169 this
sum does not begin to adequately compensate for the harm. One expert
estimated that in 2007, Americans would spend an estimated $259 mil-
lion in antispyware programs. 170 This figure does not account for indi-
rect economic effects, such as productivity losses, that occur when spy-
ware slows or shuts down a business's entire network. 17' Nor does this
figure factor in the many cases of identity theft that result from keystroke
(5) Through intentionally deceptive means, remove, disable, or render inoperative secu-
rity, antispyware, or antivirus computer software installed on the computer.
§ 19.270.020.
166. See H.B. 1012, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2005); Dixon & Givens, supra note 93.
167. See § 19.270.030.
168. § 19.270.060(3).
169. Arik Hesseldahl, Spyware by the Numbers, FORBES.COM, Jan. 17, 2005,
http://www.forbes.com/technology/2005/01/17/cx ah 0117spynumbers.html.
170. Id.
171. Hesseldahl, supra note 8.
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logging each year.172 Researchers at Webroot Software, an antispyware
software company, recently found a collection of thousands of stolen
identities from 125 countries that were believed to have been collected
by a spyware program. 173
The current cap on damages neither adequately compensates vic-
tims of spyware nor sufficiently deters current and would-be spyware
distributors. A substantial increase in the damages cap is necessary to
effectively deter these distributors, in light of the potentially large profits
possible. Although opponents of a high damages cap assert that higher
penalties will have a cooling effect on Internet innovation and encourage
many private plaintiffs to sue,17 4 failing to increase the damages cap en-
courages large spyware distributors to continue their operations because
they can receive substantially greater sums from engaging in illegal prac-
tices than they face to lose for violating the Act. For example, in Smart-
Bot.Net, the defendants made a profit of m6re than $4 million from their
spyware operations. 75 If spyware distributors who are found liable un-
der the Act can escape with a relatively nominal penalty, instead of com-
plete repayment of profits, they have a powerful incentive to relocate and
resume the same operations, despite the possibility of more fines. Dam-
ages incurred under the Act could potentially be viewed as merely a cost
of continuing business.
Additionally, because many spyware schemes are self-sustaining,
unscrupulous companies can earn large profits. These programs build
upon themselves by reinstalling software and increasing pop-ups until
the computer user capitulates by buying the marketed product that is
purported to "cure" the problem. For example, the spyware employed in
SmartBot.Net was designed to perpetuate its own installation every time
the computer user accessed the Internet. 176  Profits from this self-
sustaining enterprise would have been much larger had the court merely
ordered fines or nominal damages instead of the complete disgorgement
of profits. Although damages of $2 million would have cut the profits in
half, the company still would have escaped with a substantial profit.
The Act's maximum allowable damages award is simply not large
enough to deter actual and potential violators from engaging in the mon-
eymaking opportunity that spyware distribution provides. Therefore, the
172. Nick Booth, Surge in ID Theft Using Spyware, FORBES.COM, Sept. 19, 2005,
http://www.forbes.com/intelligentinfrastructure/2005/09/19/spyware-id-theft-cx-
vnu_0919spyware.html.
173. Paul F. Roberts, Webroot Uncovers Thousands of Stolen Identities, INFOWORLD, May 9,
2006, http://www.infoworld.com/article/06/05/09/78139_HNTrojanrebery _.html.
174. Complaint, supra note 68, 19-20.
175. Federal Trade Commission, supra note 141.
176. Complaint for Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, supra note 145, 14-15.
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legislature should amend the Act to allow the result reached in Smart-
Bot.Net: The damages limit should be increased to allow the complete
disgorgement of a liable defendant's profits obtained through violations
of the Act. Washington legislators must send a clear message to the sul-
tans of spyware: Those who profit from violating the Act will not be
permitted to retain their illegally gotten gains.
VII. CONCLUSION
Damage from spyware is steadily increasing because attacks are
more frequent, and their delivery is more sophisticated.1 77 The Act is a
timely response to this threat and has already resulted in multiple settle-
ments; it has plainly begun to have a positive impact. Moreover, because
Congress continues to delay the passage of federal legislation that would
provide a viable alternative, Washingtonians must continue to rely on the
Act. Although the Act successfully addresses many of the problems cre-
ated by spyware, the legislature should make three changes that will
more effectively deter proscribed conduct and compensate victims. First,
a more comprehensive notice requirement will not only allow Internet
users to fully understand proposed software transactions, but will also
enable spyware companies to better comply with the law. Second, rather
than forcing plaintiffs to prove the element of intentional deception on
the part of defendants, the Act should create a presumption of intentional
deception that defendants would have the burden of rebutting. The bur-
den of proof currently imposed on plaintiffs is too heavy for most spy-
ware victims to meet; in any event, defendants are better positioned to
prove what their true intent was when they distributed their software.
Finally, increasing the Act's damages cap and adding the possibility of
complete disgorgement of profits will increase the deterrent effect of the
Act and more adequately compensate victims. By amending the Act in
this fashion, the Washington legislature can both effectively protect its
citizens and remain a national leader in reducing the proliferation and
harmful effects of spyware.
177. Webroot Software, Inc., Webroot State of Spyware Report Finds 2005 Biggest Year Yet
for Spyware, Feb. 7, 2006, http://www.webroot.com/EnUS/about-press-room-press-releases-pr-
biggest-year-for-spyware.html.
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